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The Department of Defense (DOD) has some problems in its contracting 
workforce that make the department susceptible to procurement fraud. In fiscal year (FY) 
2014, $285 billion was spent on federal contracts. In FY 2015, the DOD increased its 
obligation to $290 billion. The DOD committed more money than all other government 
agencies combined. In total, the U.S. Department of Justice in its annual evaluation stated 
that there were 4,801 United States government-wide fraud investigations in 2015. 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate the knowledge level of Navy 
contracting professionals regarding procurement fraud. The research method included a 
survey that contained questions regarding contract management processes, internal 
control components, and procurement fraud schemes.  
The results of this research identified differences in levels of fraud knowledge and 
perceptions of an organization’s vulnerability to procurement fraud. The other two 
aspects of auditability are effective internal controls and capable processes. Having 
strong auditability in an organization would help to identify susceptibilities to 
procurement and assist in reducing vulnerabilities. Based on the results of the survey, 
recommendations are provided to the Navy for improvement of organizational 
auditability related to contracting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The opportunity to commit procurement fraud in the Department of Defense 
(DOD) is becoming a greater concern as the government continues to reduce the DOD’s 
budget. This budget reduction decreases the quantity of funded future projects, supplies, 
and services. Fraud within the DOD increases the costs of goods and services. If an 
agency prosecutes fraud, then fraud penalties “inefficiently increase suppliers’ costs and 
decrease competition among military suppliers” (Karpoff, Lee, & Vendrzyk, 1999, p. 5). 
Classical economist Adam Smith stated that in competition “the number of rivals, 
potential as well as present, must be sufficient to eliminate [or reduce] gains” (Stigler, 
1957, p. 2). Therefore, the more contractors are convicted of fraud, thus becoming 
ineligible for government contracts, the less competitive the market becomes, which 
would inevitably lead to an increase in prices. Similarly, research supports this concept as 
“governments in the Asia-Pacific region generally pay about 20% to 100% more for 
public goods and services due to procurement fraud” (Tan, 2013, p. 2).  
Contracting professionals, as well as all acquisition personnel, need to be diligent 
in reducing opportunities for procurement fraud. Contracting personnel duties include 
securing the right contracts and ensuring the processes of the contracts are meeting 
specific standards established by laws and regulations. The contracting agencies 
responsible for these contracts must have the appropriate training to ensure government 
funds are not being wasted or abused. 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the knowledge level of Navy 
contracting professionals regarding contract management processes, internal control 
components, and procurement fraud schemes. The research method includes a survey that 
contains questions regarding contract management processes, internal control 
components, and procurement fraud schemes. The results may identify differences 
between levels of fraud knowledge and perceptions of an organization’s vulnerability to 
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procurement fraud schemes. Based on the results of the survey, recommendations will be 
provided to the Navy for improvement of organizational auditability related to 
contracting.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Chang (2013) developed the following research questions that have been 
previously used for the Army and the Air Force: 
(1) “What is the [Navy’s] contracting professionals’ knowledge level of 
procurement fraud as related to the contract management process, 
internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes?” (p. 2) 
(2) “What is the [Navy’s] contracting professionals’ perception of 
procurement fraud vulnerability as related to the contract 
management process, internal control components, and procurement 
fraud schemes?” (p. 2) 
D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research will examine the procurement fraud knowledge level of contracting 
professionals within a United States Navy’s contracting center and will identify any areas 
within the contract management process and internal controls that are perceived by the 
contracting professionals to be vulnerable to fraud. One of the benefits could be that the 
results from the research may indicate whether or not contracting professionals need 
additional procurement fraud training to ensure competency in the Navy’s contracting 
workforce. 
Another benefit to this research is that the data from this study can be compiled 
with other fraud research studies to assess the vulnerabilities for procurement fraud 
within the DOD. The data may also be able to provide a baseline to measure and possibly 
target areas for improvement within contract management processes and internal controls 
within the Navy and DOD.  
This study has several limitations. One limitation is using an online survey method. 
To accurately assess the knowledge level of contracting professionals, a proctored survey 
may provide more accurate results. Unlimited access to online search engines enables 
survey participants to find an answer to virtually any question. However, the survey 
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questions in this research were originally developed by Chang. The questions did not come 
from a database. Additionally, every answer does not represent the same weight. For 
instance, one may consider “agree” of the same value as “strongly agree,” as both answers 
are subjective. (Wyse, 2012). 
Furthermore, people may not like acknowledging or reporting fraud for fear of 
retribution. Having contracting professionals answer an anonymous survey honestly 
could create mistrust from their leadership even though the data is aggregated. People 
may not like the negative perception associated with fraud in their organization.  
E. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
Every organization should ensure the competency of its workforce. Having 
competent personnel in an organization helps ensure detection and aids in limiting 
contracting fraud. The objective of this research is to assess the Navy’s contracting 
professionals’ knowledge level of procurement fraud. This research is significant because 
auditability in organizations is important. The DOD is trying to ensure all of its services 
are auditable. For an organization to be auditable, it should ensure its people are 
competent, processes are capable, and internal controls are effective. Auditability will be 
discussed more in Chapter II.  
The results of this research may indicate whether more fraud training is needed 
throughout the Navy’s contracting workforce. Another result may indicate whether or not 
the DOD should be focused more on the vulnerabilities in the defense and acquisition 
process. Attorney Laura Duffy from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) said 
“The more we learn about the extent of the greed and corruption, the more determined we 
are to eviscerate it” (DOJ, 2015, para. 3). A Navy contracting organization can identify 
possible areas of procurement fraud vulnerabilities by volunteering to participate in this 
survey.  
F. METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology consists of a literature review discussing auditability 
theory and the three aspects of competent personnel, capable contracting management 
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processes, and effective internal controls. An online survey was deployed to a Navy 
organization. The results of the survey assessed the competency level of the contracting 
workforce in the areas of contracting processes, internal controls, and procurement fraud 
schemes. Based on the analysis from the survey responses, recommendations are 
provided to the Navy contracting command regarding procurement fraud competence of 
the contracting workforce.  
G. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This report is organized in five chapters. Chapter I provided an introduction 
covering a background of DOD contracting, the purpose of the research, research 
questions, benefits and limitations, the importance of the research, and the methodology. 
Chapter II consists of a literature review of DOD contracting, auditability theory, 
competent personnel, capable contract management processes, effective internal control 
components, and procurement fraud scheme categories. Chapter III discusses the 
methodology used in the utilization of a previously developed assessment tool, the 
deployment of the survey, and the analysis of the survey results. Chapter IV presents the 
findings from the demographic questions, findings from the knowledge-based questions, 
analysis of the organizational questions, and recommendations for improvement based on 
the analysis. Chapter V includes a summary, conclusion, and areas for further research.  
H. SUMMARY 
The DOD is one of the largest government contracting agencies in the world, and 
the opportunity for fraud to be committed is an inherent risk whenever money is 
involved. This risk increases if there are poor processes in place. This chapter provided 
the background, the purpose, research questions, benefits and limitations, importance, 
methodology, and the organization of this research. The next chapter consists of a 
literature review of DOD contracting and auditability theory, which consist of competent 
personnel, capable contract management processes, and effective internal control 
components. The chapter concludes with a discussion of procurement fraud scheme 
categories.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter first reviews the literature on Department of Defense (DOD) 
contracting, the impact of fraud on DOD contracting, current problems in defense 
contracting, and the DOD response to procurement fraud. Next, the chapter expands on 
auditability theory while reviewing the competency of personnel, the defense contracting 
process, and internal controls. The chapter concludes with the six most common fraud 
schemes. This literature review examines the experts in the field and current research 
regarding these various subjects. Linking this areas together will illustrate modern 
defense contracting and possible weaknesses in defense contracting. An overview of 
DOD contracting is discussed in the next section. 
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING 
DOD contracting deals with a significant budget and significant issues. In fiscal 
year (FY) 2014, the DOD alone “obligated more money on federal contracts ($285 
billion) than all other government agencies combined” (Swartz, Ginsberg, & Sargent, 
2015, p. 2). In 2015, the DOD obligation increased to $290 billion and accounts for over 
half of the $560.4 billion DOD budget (Harrison, 2014). The Department of Justice 
reported 4,801 fraud investigations in 2015 (2016). The Department of State Inspector 
General (OIG, 2015) indicates Defense contracting fraud and mismanagement accounts 
for questionable costs in the DOD in the amount of $485.5 million, and $1.84 billion was 
over-obligated (2015).  
1. Procurement Weaknesses 
The DODIG and Government Accountability Office (GAO) have reported on 
possible procurement weaknesses in Defense contracting. The GAO listed “defense 
contract management as a high risk due to their greater vulnerability to fraud, waste, 
abuse and mismanagement” and has listed Defense contracting as high risk since 1992 
(Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2013, p. 2). The GAO identifies the four 
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segments of contract management that still face challenges as (1) a small acquisition 
workforce, (2) difficult contracting techniques, (3) several issues with the acquisition of 
services, and (4) limited support for operational contracting (GAO, 2013). The GAO 
(2015) considers the amount of dollars spent and the volume of transactions the DOD 
processed as an issue because of the lack of skilled personnel in the acquisition 
workforce.  
Some of the problems in DOD contracting include an increasing acquisition force, 
decreasing contracting offices, and the lack of critical training. The DODIG summarized 
specific deficiencies over the course of seven fiscal years as 467 contract process 
deficiencies ranging from the more prevalent acquisition planning deficiencies to the 
rarer competition deficiencies during solicitation (Hidaka & Owens, 2015). The six 
contracting processes ranked from highest to lowest deficiencies are “contract 
administration, procurement planning, solicitation planning, source selection, contract 
closeout, and solicitation” (Hidaka & Owens, 2015, p. 50).  
2. DOD Response to Procurement Weaknesses 
The DOD responded to the GAO’s high risk assessment and the DODIG’s 
contracting process deficiencies by providing more training to contracting professionals 
and additional guidance on contracting processes. As the DOD addresses the competency 
of contracting professionals and contracting processes, the results should reduce 
deficiencies. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics’ 
(USD[AT&L]) most substantial correction to deficiencies was the Better Buying Power 
initiative. Five of the seven principles in the Better Buying Power initiative focus on 
process improvements for the acquisition workforce. The remaining principles, “improve 
tradecraft in acquisition of services” and “improve the professionalism of the total 
acquisition workforce,” focus on training of personnel (Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2016, para.1). In addition, 
Castillo and Flanigan’s (2014) research concluded that the DOD had increased 
acquisition workforces, but it had never included additional required training for the 
workforce or Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs).  
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The solution does not solely rest on developing competency in contracting 
personnel. Rendon and Rendon propose that the “DOD [emphasizes] procurement 
training of its workforce” but that it is not “placing an equal emphasis on its procurement 
processes or internal controls” (Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 711). In 2011, the 
USD(AT&L) Ash Carter instituted other requirements, such as posting a DODIG Fraud 
Hotline Poster, establishing and maintaining internal controls, notifying the Office of the 
Inspector General whenever the organization becomes aware of fraud, and instituting 
additional required ethics training (USD[AT&L], 2011). In response to several 
department-wide issues concerning fraud, waste and abuse, Congress directed the 
creation of a Continuous Learning Module (CLM) 049—Procurement Fraud Indicators 
(Castillo & Flanigan, 2014). These responses from Congress and AT&L responses 
attempted to address procurement contracting weaknesses but failed to address the 
deficiencies that the weaknesses had created. 
3. Implications of Contract Deficiencies 
Denis (2009) notes two issues in the contracting profession: a growing list of 
responsibilities and a shortage of trained personnel. This imbalance may inevitably slow 
procurement process and create more fraud opportunities. Despite the USD(AT&L)’s 
many new requirements imposed on the contracting workforce, in 2011 Carter remarked 
“it is not clear, however, that these remedies are sufficient” (USD[AT&L], 2011, p. 11). 
Between 2011 and 2015, suspensions for contractors almost doubled from 74 to 124, and 
debarments increased by almost 150% from 130 to 179 (OIG, 2015). These increases in 
suspensions and debarments may constrict future competition and possibly drive up 
prices.  
Despite the apparent increases in suspensions and debarments, defense hotline 
calls dropped from 9,340 in 2011 (DODIG, 2011) to 5,932 in 2015 (OIG, 2015). The 
researchers contend that this decrease indicates that either fraud is detected during 
external audits vice during the contracting process, or that DOD is taking a harder stance 
on contractor misconduct. Furthermore, Castillo and Flanigan (2014) summarize that 
limited fraud indicators and internal control training taught within Defense Acquisition 
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University contribute to GAO’s high risk designation. This lack of training may cause 
contracting personnel to miss signs of fraud. Competent personnel is one aspect of 
auditability in organizations. In total there are three aspects comprise auditability theory, 
which are discussed in the next section. 
C. AUDITABILITY THEORY 
Auditability theory began with research conducted by Power. Power addressed a 
need for independent authentication that “has the virtues of objectivity, publicity, and 
replicability” (Power, 1996, p. 289). Rendon and Rendon view auditability as a 
transformation of an organization when “organizations establish data collection practices 
and systems of documentation to make them auditable” (R. G. Rendon & Rendon, 2015, 
p. 713). When effective auditability is in place, an organization is more capable of 
detecting and deterring fraud.  
Weigand, Johannesson, Andersson, Bergholtz, and Bukhsh (2013) divided 
auditability into four separate audit focused levels shown in Table 1. The levels begin 
individually with tedious labor intensive transaction based audit types and ultimately 
reach management via accounting information systems. Weigand et al. (2013) contend 
that “if the manager is in control, by implication the validity of the accounts and the norm 
compliance of the agent performance are guaranteed” (p. 6). This guarantee allows 
transparent audits to infiltrate all levels and ensure auditability. Using the four-level 
auditability framework, organizations can have multiple internal controls in place and 
achieve a higher level of auditability (Weigand et al., 2013). 
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Table 1.   Main Auditability Levels. Source: Weigand et al. (2013, p. 5). 
 
 
In addition to auditability occurring at different levels of an organization, 
auditability requires three aspects to be effective. Rendon and Rendon show in Figure 1 
the auditability triangle concept as a synergy of “competent personnel, capable processes, 
and effective internal controls” (J. M. Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Auditability Triangle. Source: R. G. Rendon & Rendon (2015, p. 716). 
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Auditability flows from the lowest level up. Effective auditability occurs when 
such synergies are in place involving personnel, processes, and internal controls. The first 
aspect of auditability is competent personnel, which is discussed in the next section. 
D. COMPETENT PERSONNEL 
Rendon and Rendon define competent personnel as those with “necessary 
education, training, and experience requirements for each functional area” (R. G. Rendon 
& Rendon, 2015, p. 716). DOD contracting suffers from a low quantity of trained 
personnel and the low quality of the overall training (Hidaka & Owens, 2015). 
Contracting competency begins with education, training, and contracting field 
experience. In 1991, the Defense Authorization Act established the Acquisition Corps 
and with it the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) to improve 
the effectiveness of training of personnel. DAWIA has established requirements for 
contracting personnel both military and 1102 Civil Servants at three levels of DAWIA 
certification (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], n.d.-a). Level I DAWIA 
certification requires “10 functional training classes, 24 hours in accounting, law, 
business, finance, contracts, purchasing, management, marketing, quantitative methods or 
organization and management, a Baccalaureate degree, and one year of contracting 
experience” (DAU, n.d.-a, para. 1). Level II DAWIA certification adds “one acquisition 
training class, eight functional training classes, and a second year of contracting 
experience” (DAU, n.d.-b, para. 1). Level III DAWIA certification adds “a second 
acquisition training class, eleven additional functional training classes, and a total of four 
years in contracting experience” (DAU, n.d.-c, para. 1).  
Personnel competency encompasses more than DAWIA certification. Since the 
requirements of all DAWIA certifications include a Baccalaureate degree in any field and 
contracting work experience, many will start their contracting careers with limited or no 
on-the-job-training.  
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1. Low Quantity of Trained Personnel in Contracting 
Figure 2 shows that the DOD has increased its acquisition workforce from 
126,000 in September 2008 to about 153,000 in March 2015, but has under-targeted the 
growth in the contracting workforce (GAO, 2015).  
 
Figure 2.  Decrease in Growth of Contracting. Source: GAO (2015). 
In FY 2012, Hidaka and Owens’ (2015) research found that 57% of personnel in 
the defense contracting field were within ten years of retirement. Since 2015, between 
17% and 20% of personnel in the defense contracting field have retired. In addition, 
Rodriguez’s (2013) research found a decrease in contracting personnel hiring as low as 
7% annually, despite an annual retirement of approximately 10%. The three combined 
traits of a low rehire rate, the reduction in force, and the increase in recent retirements has 
led to a reduction in the contracting professional workforce.  
2. Low Quality in Training for Contracting Personnel 
Certification is not sufficient for competency. Certification is important as “90.4% 
of all practitioners perceive a linkage between certification and knowledge” (Prier, 
McCue, & Behara, 2010, p. 524). Wilkinson stated, “if you are a GS-1102 federal 
employee with a Level II certification and 24 business credit hours, congratulations” but 
“they are minimum requirements of contract management” (Wilkinson, 2015, p. 3). 
Furthermore, in evaluating training for fraud, it is evident that DAU training has “limited 
offerings of procurement fraud, waste and abuse” (Rodriguez, 2013, p. 43). Specifically, 
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the Congress directed acquisition refresher CLM 049 is not a core curriculum for any of 
the 14 Acquisition fields for the various DAWIA Level I, II or III certifications 
(Rodriguez, 2013). 
A 2013 survey assessed competent people and vulnerability perception. Chang 
(2013) surveyed Army personnel specifically on knowledge of fraud and internal controls 
with results of 64.3% accurate for military and 62.4% accurate for civilians. Castillo and 
Flanigan (2014) conducted a survey on Air Force personnel on the knowledge of fraud 
and internal controls, which also resulted poorly averaging 69.2% and 64.9% 
respectively. Castillo and Flanigan (2014) also concluded that the Air Force organization 
may lack the training to correctly identify fraud schemes in contracting. The fault does 
not solely lie on the contracting office, as there is “an important [need] for senior 
organizational management…to understand their roles and responsibilities in support of 
the contract management process” (Rendon, 2015, p. 1490).  
After a sufficient number of contracting personnel have been properly trained and 
become competent in their areas, they must work together during the contract 
management process. The second aspect of auditability is capable contract management 
processes, which is discussed in the next section.  
E. CAPABLE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESSES 
Rendon and Rendon define capable processes as contracting processes that are 
“fully-established, institutionalized, mandated, integrated with other organizational 
processes, periodically measured, and continuously improved” (R. G. Rendon & Rendon, 
2015, p. 716). Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101 states, “Acquisition planning 
means the process by which the efforts of all personnel responsible for an acquisition are 
coordinated and integrated through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in 
a timely manner and at a reasonable cost” (FAR, 2016). The DOD maintains a credit card 
threshold of $2,500 for services and $3,500 for supplies. If it is above this threshold, a 
contract is a more suitable means of procurement. DAU defines a contract as “a mutually 
binding legal relationship obligating the seller to furnish supplies or services (including 
construction) and the buyer to pay for them” (“Contract,” n.d., para. 1). Schwartz noted 
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that the DOD’s acquisition process is “highly complex and does not always produce 
systems that meet estimated cost or performance expectations” (Schqartz, 2014, p. 1). 
Castillo and Flanigan argue that “for those organizations not directly involved [in the 
contracting process], the contracting process is considered a simple one” (Castillo & 
Flanigan, 2014, p. 7). Regardless of perceived difficulty, defense contracting splits into 
three areas: pre-award, award, post-award. These areas subdivide further into six total 
processes. The next sections describe these six contract management processes. 
1. Pre-Award: Procurement Planning 
Garrett defines procurement planning as “determining whether to procure, how to 
procure, what to procure, how much to procure, and when to procure” (Garrett, 2013, p. 
43). Procurement planning is “an important part of contract management because it 
establishes the foundation for future successes or problems” (Hidaka & Owens, 2015, p. 
13). Rendon (2007) summarizes key activities during this process as designing scope, 
conducting market research, evaluating funds, estimating an initial cost, predicting 
schedule, and determining manpower requirements. 
Defining the requirement answers the question of whether to procure. Castillo and 
Flanigan (2014) reference FAR 7 in these questions during this process: Is it a product or 
service that a customer needs? Is it the first time it’s been procured? Is it available 
commercially? How long is it required? How complex is it? This narrows the need for 
procurement to what is only required and at proper quantities. These procurements can be 
either a product or a service. FAR 37 summarizes services available for procurement but 
limits services to non-inherently government functions such as some defense-related 
duties and many consulting duties (FAR, 2016).  
Once the decision to make or buy is made, market research commences to answer 
the question of how to procure. FAR 10 states that market research is used to answer if 
sources exist, if the products or services needed are commercial, if there are bundling 
options, and if there is a baseline for pricing (FAR, 2016). Finally, the requirements 
documents will capture the what, when, and how much in one of three documents. The 
statements of work are related to the acquisition of supplies (Moschler & Weitzner, 
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2012). Second, the statement of objectives is broader in order to describe unclear or 
technically developing solicitations (Moschler & Weitzner, 2012). Finally, the 
performance work statements are designed when there are service performance based 
outcomes (Moschler & Weitzner, 2012).  
2. Pre-Award: Solicitation Planning 
Garrett defines solicitation planning as the “buyer [understanding] its own 
requirements…and must be able to communicate those requirements in the form of 
deliverables” (Garrett, 2007, p. 24). This is done by taking the management’s 
procurement plan, other planning documents, or a statement of work to create 
procurement documentation that uses the proper evaluation criteria (Garrett, 2007). Once 
an organization determines if the risk level is high for the government, the contract 
generally becomes cost reimbursable. The lower risk and commercially available 
contracts generally become fixed-price contracts. The DOD determines the type of 
contract based on risk, price, and incentives. FAR parts 19 and 26 also state federal 
contracting is to utilize “small businesses, woman-owned small business, small 
disadvantaged business, historically underutilized business zone, veteran-owned small 
business, and service disabled veteran owned small businesses” (FAR, 2016, section 
19202). This phase results in the preparation of a solicitation document. 
3. Pre-Award: Solicitation 
DAU defines solicitations as “any request to submit offers or quotations to the 
government” (DAU, 2012, para. 1). Three methods of procuring are via government 
purchase card, simplified acquisition threshold, and soliciting to contractors using the 
best value continuum outlined in FAR 15 (FAR, 2016). If procurement is above $3,500, 
contracting might use pre-proposal conferences but must publicize to increase 
competition and broaden industry participation per FAR 5.002 (FAR, 2016). The Federal 
Business Opportunities (FEDBIZZOPS) website advertises the procurement 
opportunities of the federal government to contractors. During this phase, contracting 
offices will keep a list of qualified bidders and ensure contractors see amendments as 
they occur, but limit the exchange of information to those listed in FAR 15.201 (FAR, 
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2016). This phase concludes with the posting of the solicitation to the FEDBIZZOPS 
website. 
4. Award: Source Selection 
In this phase, the source selection board evaluates qualified proposals, applies 
evaluation criteria set in procurement planning, negotiates contract terms and conditions, 
sets contractor responsibility standards, and ultimately selects a contractor if enough 
competition exists (Garrett, 2013). If the contract is simple, proposals may be evaluated 
by one person. If the contract is complex, the source selection board has several tools to 
select proposals such as a weighing system, screening system, and the possibility of 
independent estimates (Garrett, 2007). During the evaluation criteria, the source selection 
board weighs each proposal based on attributes, management, technical, price, and past 
performance pre-determined in the request for proposal (Garrett, 2007). Once source 
selection concludes, negotiating starts, and cost analysis of the contractor begins. This 
phase concludes with the finalizing negotiations and producing an agreed-upon contract. 
5. Post-Award: Contract Administration 
Garrett defines contract administration as “a process of ensuring each party’s 
performance meets the contractual requirements” (Garrett, 2013, p. 46). Contract 
administration occurs through several agencies and in several ways. The contracting 
office conducts a pre-performance conference with the contracting officer, prime (or 
lead) contractor, sub-prime contractor, COR, and Defense Contracting Management 
Agency. Second, the team evaluates performance through earned value management, 
budget analysis, and schedule analysis with the Program Management team (Garrett, 
2013). Third, the contracting officer must ensure the prime contractor is managing all 
FAR 22 and 23 applicable labor laws and restrictions (FAR, 2016).  
The CORs are vital to this phase as they are responsible for surveying the 
contractor’s progress and documenting receipt and delivery. The contracting officer must 
measure and report a contractor’s cost against FAR 29–32. In addition, the contracting 
officer must ensure deliveries against the agreed upon master schedule. During this 
phase, the performance of the contractor is evaluated using the contract administration 
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office (CAO) or administrative contract officer (ACO) discussed in FAR 42.302 and 42.6 
(FAR, 2016). Finally, the FAR 43 allows for contract modifications to ensure the contract 
reflects current requirements (FAR, 2016). If done correctly, this phase results in a 
completed contract. However, other results might include termination for cause or 
termination for convenience, which will be discussed next. 
6. Post-Award: Contract Closeout 
Garrett defines contract closeout as “all administrative matters are concluded on a 
contract that is otherwise physically complete” (Garrett, 2013, p. 47). In short, a contract 
closeout is final delivery, receipt, inspection, acceptance, and payment. In order for a 
contract to be closed out, the government requires proper paperwork of a closeout report, 
certificate of completion, seller’s release of claims, and contract closeout checklist 
(Garrett, 2007). This phase results in the evaluation of the contractor via the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS). This allows contractors to develop 
past performance that will be evaluated in future contracts.  
Organizations must have capable contract management processes for sufficient 
auditability. Capable contracting management processes is the second aspect of 
auditability theory. The final aspect of auditability is effective internal controls, which is 
discussed in the next section. 
F. EFFECTIVE INTERNAL CONTROLS 
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) defines internal controls as 
“a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and other personnel, 
designed to provide a reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting” (Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission 
[COSO], 2013, p. 3). Effective internal control components ensure the organization is 
“[complying] with laws and regulations, monitoring procedures to assess enforcement, 
and reporting material weaknesses” (R.G. Rendon & Rendon, 2015). Internal controls are 
essential for organizations to maintain internal awareness and to enforce current protocols 
to ensure a standard of reporting. Figure 3 illustrates effective internal controls in an 
organization in order to achieve its objective (GAO, 2014). COSO (2013) considers 
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internal controls as regulations that affect all personnel and are designed to meet the 
organization’s objectives of operations, reporting, and compliance. 
 
Figure 3.  Achieving Objectives Through Internal Controls. 
Source: GAO (2014, p. 5). 
The GAO’s Green Book Standards for Internal Control in the Federal 
Government published the current standards based on the COSO Internal Control 
Framework. Figure 4 shows the five components of “control environment, risk 
assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities” 
(COSO, 2013, p. 6).  
 
Figure 4.  Relationship of Objectives and Components. 
Source: COSO (2013, p. 6) 
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Figure 5 shows that the five components are broken down into 17 principles. 
COSO 2013 describes an organization applying “all principles to operations, reporting, 
and compliance objectives to achieve effective internal control” (COSO, 2013, p. 3). 
 
Figure 5.  COSO’s 17 Fundamental Principles. 
Adapted from COSO (2013, p. 6). 
1. Control Environment 
COSO (2013) defines control environment as “the set of standards, processes, and 
structures that provide the basis for carrying out internal control across the organization” 
(p. 4). The control environment sets the tone for the organization. Figure 5 shows the five 
fundamental principles of control environment as a “commitment to integrity and ethical 
values, oversight of the internal control system, an understood chain of command, 
competent personnel, and subordinates’ responsibility and authority” (COSO, 2013, p. 6).  
An effective control environment operates efficiently. A poor control environment 
can lead to loss of faith in financial reporting or possibly the company’s ability to lead 
(Doss & Jonas, 2004). The five fundamental principles affect all personnel in the 
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organization (McNally, 2013). The first integrated component is control environment; the 
second component is risk assessment. 
2. Risk Assessment 
COSO (2013) defines risk assessment as “the possibility that an event will occur 
and adversely affect the achievement of objectives” (p. 4). During risk assessment, fraud 
vulnerability is addressed in relation to the risks taken (GAO, 2014). As Figure 5 (COSO, 
2013, p. 6) shows, the four fundamental principles of risk assessment are “setting specific 
objectives, identifying and analyze risk, assessing fraud risk, and analyzing for significant 
changes” (COSO, 2013, p. 7). The risk should be measured against acceptable tolerance 
and against all regulations. Once senior leadership measures the risk, it should align with 
current operations, financial needs, and accurate reporting.  
GAO (2014) concludes that risk tolerance is not the same as compliance. In other 
words, either an organization complies with rules and regulations, or it does not. Risk in 
one department may affect another department. For example, a deficiency in the 
contracting selection board might cancel the entire solicitation effort and double the 
workload if re-submittal has to occur. Proper response to risk is summarized in GAO’s 
report as acceptance, avoidance, reduction, and sharing (GAO, 2014). Incorrect financial 
reporting, misuse of assets, and other fraud must be evaluated when evaluating risk 
internally. These risks can increase if the fraud triangle components, which include 
perceived pressure, perceived opportunity, and rationalization, are present (Figure 7).  
Rendon and Rendon discuss risk increasing when “weak internal controls, poor 
leadership, poor accountability, and lack of transparency nurture the opportunity for fraud 
in an organization” (J. M. Rendon & R. G. Rendon, 2015, p. 717). To decrease the 
likelihood of internal corruption, an organization should conduct a thorough self-
assessment. Risk assessment is the second integrated component of internal controls; the 
third is control activities. 
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3. Control Activities 
COSO (2013) defines control activities as “actions established through policies 
and procedures that help ensure that management’s directives to mitigate risks to the 
achievement of objectives are carried out” (p. 4). This is the functional efficiency of the 
organization. The three fundamental principles of control activities are the management’s 
responsibilities to design, develop, and implement a system through policies to achieve 
objectives (Figure 5). The key is the correct level of control. If control is too onerous, 
work may become inefficient, and over-regulation may degrade effectiveness. If control 
is too weak, visibility may be limited. To decrease the risk further, GAO (2014) mandates 
segregating the key functions of authority, custody, and accounting functions in order to 
negate possible conflicts of interest.  
Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979) theorize that five traits of policies must exist to 
be effective. Policies must have a correlation between target behavior and end state, must 
be unambiguous, must be enforced by competent leadership, must encourage buy-in, and 
must not contradict other policies currently in place (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1979). The 
more traits covered by control activities, the greater the effectiveness of the policies and 
procedures to reach the organization’s objective. When personnel in organizations 
embrace control activities, policies feel less restrictive to them.  
However, these control activities will not work without making policies and 
procedures mandatory. Boss, Kirsch, Angermeier, Shingler, and Boss (2009) discuss how 
“routine security policies can dissuade employees from using them, and thus become 
vulnerable to unwelcome externalities” (p. 151). By mandating rules or the term 
“mandatoriness,” employees commit in three different ways by internalizing the rules, 
identifying with the rules, and ultimately complying with the rules (Boss et al., 2009). 
Control activities that become mandated will become the culture of the organization for 
better or for worse. 
GAO (2014) contends that effective control activities help prevent or detect fraud, 
are performed at a higher level, are routine and consistent, and are directly related to an 
operational process. Information systems that gather control activities should be 
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complete, accurate, and valid to be effective. With these elements in place, senior 
leadership has a deeper understanding of the financial intricacies of their organization. 
The third integrated component is control activities; the fourth component is information 
and communication. 
4. Information and Communication 
COSO (2013) defines information as “necessary [details] for the entity to carry 
out internal control responsibilities to support the achievement of its objective” (p. 5). 
Separately, COSO (2013) defines communication as “the continual, iterative process of 
providing, sharing, and obtaining necessary information” (p. 5). Communicating relevant 
and accurate information is the key to a successful organization and the starting point for 
identifying fraud. The three fundamental principles of information and communication 
are high quality information, internally communicated information, and externally 
communicated information (Figure 5).  
Information gathered must be from a relevant and reliable source. A 1991 study 
showed a direct correlation between the success of a business and market research 
received from “trusted and immediate sources” (Hartman, 1994, p. 37). Information must 
be shown to senior members of the organization, as well as disbursed to other members 
directly influenced by the results of the information. GAO (2001) describes effective 
communication as information given in the correct form, to the correct recipients, and at 
the correct time.  
Information is powerful in that it can be an equalizer between a company with 
larger capacity and a company with smaller capacity (Li, Li, Liu & Barnes, 2011). 
Therefore, protecting information is just as important as collecting information. For 
example, the contracting office gathers in-depth information regarding a company’s 
capacity and pricing data that would be detrimental if it fell into the hands of a 
competitor. Similarly, intellectual property, pricing data, and other critical knowledge 
must be guarded by the contractor against fraudulent acts like espionage. The fourth 
integrated component is information and communication; the fifth and final component is 
monitoring activities.  
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5. Monitoring Activities 
COSO (2013) defines monitoring activities as “ongoing evaluations, separate 
evaluations, or some combination of the two” which are used to determine whether 
internal controls are available and working (p. 5). As a note, GAO (2014) used the 
original title “monitoring” when addressing this component. This component entails 
making adjustments or changes to control procedures (J. M. Rendon & Rendon, 2016). 
The two principles of monitoring activities are conducting repetitive evaluations and 
taking a closer look at any deficiencies found (McNally, 2013).  
Monitoring activities grant leadership a full visibility of changes, strengths, and 
weaknesses in their organization. It is a chance for subordinates to highlight deficiencies, 
senior leadership to analyze trends, and all to take follow-up actions. With 
“mandatoriness” in effect, leadership needs to encourage all its members to speak out and 
protect against reprisals. All domestic companies are subjected to the April 1989 
Whistleblower Protection Act which gives freedom for employees to report fraud, waste, 
and abuse without fear of reprisal (Bond, 2009). The Whistleblower Protection 
Enhancement Act has expanded to include abuse of power and public health (Bond, 
2009). Other avenues to address high risks, fraud, waste, and abuse are department-led 
inspector general offices such as DODIG.  
Grant Thornton LLP (2009) developed additional guidance after noting many in 
industry have felt monitoring to be “a time-consuming task that involves a significant 
amount of annual management” (p. 1). For this reason, many organizations do not use 
monitoring to its fullest capacity in assessing effective internal controls. GAO (2001) 
encourages meetings for employees to see whether the current internal controls are 
effective. If separate evaluations occur, this assists in diffusing favoritism or internal 
collusion. Separate evaluations also ensure multiple evaluators are valuing reporting 
standards for clarity, quality, and accuracy. Separate evaluations occur when companies 
go through changes in leadership, inspector general inspections, and internal/external 
audits. All five integrated components are essential for internal controls. Organizations 
without these components in place may follow a five-step transition plan, which is 
discussed in the next section. 
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6. The Five-Step Transition 
In the most recent update to COSO, McNally (2013) discussed how organizations 
can transition to the 2013 model. Figure 6 shows the five-step transition applicable for 
those organizations without internal controls in place or those lacking sufficient internal 
controls.  
 
Figure 6.   How to Transition to Proper Internal Controls Implementation. 
Source: McNally (2013).  
Step one refers to managers ensuring internal controls are in working order 
(McNally, 2013). Step two refers to the analysis that should be done on the impact of any 
deficiencies found (McNally, 2013). Step three refers to employee awareness and training 
of updated internal control procedures (McNally, 2013). Step four refers to organizations 
developing a plan to finalize the COSO transition (McNally, 2013). Step five refers to 
organizations implementing continuous process improvement and self-evaluation 
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programs (McNally, 2013). As internal controls affect federal and non-federal companies 
alike, early controls act as prevention against a possible crisis (Chan, 2006). Companies 
that have proper internal controls in place benefit from leadership setting the tone, 
streamlining business processes, and maintaining the proper risk in management among 
other things (Chan, 2006). 
Effective internal controls are the third aspect to the auditability theory (Figure 1). 
The three aspects of the auditability triangle, which include competent personnel, capable 
processes and effective internal controls, work together to reduce, detect, and help to 
deter the various types of fraud schemes. These fraud schemes will be discussed in the 
next section.  
G. PROCUREMENT FRAUD SCHEME CATEGORIES  
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) uses Black’s Law 
Dictionary to define fraud as “a knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of 
a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment” (Association of Certified 
Fraud Examiners [ACFE], n.d.-b, para. 2). Fraud theory was conceptualized in the 1940s 
by criminologist Cressey. While interviewing over 200 incarcerated embezzlers, Cressey 
identified that the fraudsters had three things in common, which included motivation 
(also called pressure), opportunity, and rationalization (Wells, 2001). 
 
Figure 7.   Fraud Triangle. Source: Albrecht (2014, para. 1). 
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Cressey determined that if three factors are met, the organization is more susceptible to 
fraud by individuals with these traits.  
Fraud schemes in contracting can be divided into internal and external fraud. 
Internal or occupational fraud is “the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment” 
(ACFE, n.d.-b, para. 5). Internal fraud does not only mean fraud intra-organization, but 
can also include collusion between employees and contractors (Tan, 2013). The ACFE 
classifies external fraud into subcategories of dishonest vendor, dishonest customer, and 
dishonest third party (ACFE, n.d.-b). Regarding the federal contracting organization, the 
six most common procurement fraud schemes are fraudulent bidding, billing schemes, 
collusion, conflict of interest, fraudulent purchases, and fraudulent representation.  
1. Fraudulent Bidding  
Wells (2005) defines fraudulent bidding or “bid rigging as a process by which an 
employee assists a vendor to fraudulently win a contract through the competitive bidding 
process” (p. 283). Wells (2005) categorizes fraudulent bidding by when it occurs in the 
contracting process. During the procurement phase, a need recognition scheme may occur 
where the “buyer receives something of value” in exchange for developing the need for a 
good or service (Wells, 2005, p. 268). Similarly during the procurement phase, a 
specifications scheme can be a payoff of the buyer in exchange for “tailoring the 
specifications to a particular vendor” (Wells, 2005, p. 268). During the solicitation phase, 
“bid pooling may occur where several bidders conspire to split up the contract and each 
gain an amount of work” (Wells, 2005, p. 269). Another type of fraudulent bidding in the 
solicitation phase is the fictitious supplier where a shell company is used to ensure a bid 
is won (Wells, 2005). Other solicitation issues may arrive when vendors fail to bid, 
inflate prices, or withdraw bids at the last moment. During the source selection phase, 
fraudulent bidding may occur in the form of a bribe (Wells, 2005). 
Protection against kickbacks during fraudulent bidding is the Anti-Kickback Act. 
Fraudulent bidding is unique in that it may be purely external to the contracting office. 
LaCasse remarks that fraudulent bidding is difficult for legal authority to determine “on 
the basis of bids alone, that a conspiracy has formed” (LaCasse, 1995, p. 398). Protection 
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against fraudulent bidding stems from market research conducted by the contracting 
office. No bids or extreme variances in a competitive market might be an indicator of 
fraud. Regarding internal collusion, contracting offices must ensure the selection process 
is objective as possible and free of bias. 
2. Billing, Cost, and Pricing Schemes  
Wells (2005) defines billing schemes as a vendor receiving “fraudulent payment 
by submitting invoices for fictitious goods or services, inflated invoices, or invoices for 
personal purchases” (p. 98). The most effective way of detecting a billing scheme is a tip 
from an employee (Wells, 2005). As mentioned before, with the Whistleblower 
Protection Act in place, subordinates have an avenue to report concerns without fear of 
reprisals.  
Protection against billing schemes may be as using a certain type of contract for 
the procurement. Inflated prices are not normally an issue with fixed-price contracts, as 
any inflated price directly results in lost profits for the company. However, in cost 
reimbursable contracts, the incentive is higher for price inflation. Price inflation may 
occur via payroll schemes including over-commission schemes, phantom employee 
schemes, and overpayment schemes. Phantom or ghost employee schemes occur when 
the payroll office invents non-existing personnel in order to obtain more money from a 
contract. Overpayment schemes occur with falsified hours or rates. Commission schemes 
are a type of inflated sales (ACFE, n.d.-a). Other schemes include check tampering and 
expense schemes. Manipulation of the billing system can occur in other ways to defraud 
the government of money not due the contractor. Generally, billing schemes are more 
common when pricing is not verified against current market competition, opening the 
door to price inflation. 
3. Collusion  
Wells (2005) defines collusion as “a situation where two or more employees work 
together to commit fraud by overcoming a well-designed internal control system” (p. 
122). Collusion can be done in falsification of hours, kickbacks, and shell companies. 
Falsification of hours can happen when a subordinate colludes with a supervisor to 
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increase hourly pay for a kickback (Wells, 2005). Fraudulent hours can also be obtained 
via payroll collusion where the subordinate seeks another administrative sign off on the 
incorrect hours (Wells, 2005). Collusion can also happen when the COR knowingly 
endorses an incorrect number of hours for a contractor’s work. Kickbacks are schemes 
that occur “where vendor pays back a portion of the purchase price to an employee” in 
order to gain favor (Wells, 2005, p. 283). Shell companies are “a fictitious entity created 
for the sole purpose of creating fraud” (Wells, 2005, p. 122). This is the case when a 
larger company who may not qualify for the small business benefits, creates a shell 
company to attempt to win a bid. Collusion occurrences may be reduced by the Small 
Business Association ensuring legitimacy of small businesses, current market research, 
and past performance evaluations. 
Both falsified hours and kickbacks can be seen in the PMA Services Limited case 
where contractors bribed the U.S. military in exchange for kickbacks in construction 
projects (OIG, 2015). Congress passed the Copeland “Anti-Kickback Act” in 1934 to 
prosecute violators (Thai, 2000). Violations of the Copeland Act are imprisonment and/or 
fines for both the vendor and the buyer receiving the kickback (Thai, 2000). Laffont and 
Martimort (1998) stipulate that in contracting offices where vendors are properly vetted, 
collusion is not an issue.  
4. Conflict of Interest 
Wells (2005) defines conflict of interest as “when an employee, manager, or 
executive has an undisclosed economic or personal interest in a transaction that adversely 
affects the company” (p. 273). If personnel have all attributes of the fraud triangle, then 
conflict of interest has a higher probability of occurring. Source selection is at risk of 
conflict of interest “when a member of the source selection team may have interests, 
financial or other, in one of the offerors” (Castillo & Flanigan, 2014, p. 24).  
Protection against conflict of interest include Title 18 U.S.C. § 208 and 209, 
which restrict external compensation and delay or limit post-contracting office 
employment opportunities. Section 208, titled “Acts Affecting a Personal Financial 
Interest,” makes it illegal for contracting personnel to financially benefit from contracts 
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that they administer (Roberts, 2010). Section 209 makes it illegal for a contracting officer 
to receive additional pay outside of federal wages and earned benefits (Roberts, 2010). 
Ethics regarding conflicts of interest are covered in detail in FAR 2.101-1 reminding 
federal employees to remain above reproach and impartial (FAR, 2016).  
5. Fraudulent Purchases  
Wells (2005) defines fraudulent purchases as purchasing “personal items with 
company money” (p. 114). Fraudulent purchases occur when the requestor is buying 
materials or services for personal needs rather than for government needs. This can occur 
internally within contracting offices or externally via contractors. GAO (2002) indicates 
that fraudulent purchases are more prevalent in government purchase card programs.  
Protection against fraudulent purchases on a government credit card is oversight 
by the approving officer prior to every purchase. Another fraudulent purchase issue 
involves vendors charging for items not received under initial order (GAO, 2002) 
Protection against vendor overcharge may include ensuring proper training of the COR or 
the receiving official correctly verifying receipt. The final fraudulent purchase issue 
involves collusion between a contractor and a contracting office which leads to 
requesting more items than is required to fulfill the mission (Wells, 2005). Protection 
against collusion on fraudulent purchases involves ensuring that the solicitation defines 
the actual requirement of the end user. 
6. Fraudulent Representation  
Wells (2005) defines fraudulent representation as when “vendors provide real 
goods or services, albeit in an inflated price” (p. 265). Also called product substitution or 
“bait and switch,” the issue unfairly increases profit by the contractor at substandard 
quality. One notable case of this involves the contractor AEY, Inc. winning a $300 
million contract to distribute weapons to Afghanistan. AEY, Inc. substituted the 
ammunition contracted for outdated People’s Republic of China ammunition from an 
Eastern bloc country (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2008). In this 
case, AEY Inc. purposely hid documents and original Chinese stickers to conceal the 
place of manufacturing. Not only was the ammunition substandard, but it broke the 
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Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement that states munitions “may not be 
acquired, directly or indirectly from a Communist Chinese military company” 
(Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2008, p. 22). 
Protection against fraudulent representation stems from the “Lincoln Law” also 
called the False Claims Act (France, 1990). This law empowers those using the 
Whistleblower Protection Act to at least 15% of total damages and the fines that it 
recoups (France, 1990). This is a substantial incentive for those witnessing fraud in their 
organization. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided foundational information on DOD contracting, the impact 
of fraud on DOD contracting, current problems in defense contracting, and the DOD’s 
response to fraud. Next, the chapter expanded on auditability theory and reviewed 
competency of personnel, the defense contracting process, and internal controls. The 
chapter concluded with the six most common fraud schemes. The literature review 
focused on examining the work of experts in the field and current research regarding 
these subjects. The next chapter describes the methodology used for this research.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the methodology applied for this research. The chapter 
consists of three sections: development of the assessment tool, the deployment of the 
survey, and analyses of survey results. The development of the assessment tool discusses 
the sources used to develop the questions which consisted of demographic, knowledge-
based, and the organizational perception. The deployment of the survey section discusses 
how the survey was deployed, who it was administered to, and the timeframe given to 
complete it. The researchers analyzed the survey responses based on the contract 
management processes, internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes. 
Furthermore, this research analyzes the contracting professionals’ perceptions of 
procurement fraud susceptibilities within their organizations.  
B. DEVELOPMENT OF ASSESSMENT TOOL 
The function of the survey is to assess contracting professionals’ knowledge level 
of procurement fraud. The survey allowed contracting professionals in a Navy organization 
to answer multiple choice questions relating to procurement fraud. This study used a survey 
by Chang and applied it to a different population. Chang states in page 31 of his report:  
The aim was to base these questions on a general knowledge of fraud 
schemes and not on any information listed in regulations. The questions 
were developed for each process of the contract management process and 
further identified according to their associated internal control component 
and procurement fraud scheme. The survey also included Likert scale 
questions dealing with organizational environment and fraud. (Chang, 2013, 
p. 31) 
1. Sources Used to Develop Questions 
The assessment questions developed by Chang in a previous study are used in this 
research. According to Chang (2013), the main source used to develop the survey was the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of the Inspector General, 
Office of Investigation’s Fraud Indicators Handbook. The handbook classifies indicators 
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“based on schemes, contracting process, and personnel conducting the fraud” (Chang, 
2013, p. 31). The DODIG’s report (2010) was also used to develop the survey questions. 
Chang states the two reports are similar because they both contain “lists of fraud indicators 
as organized by various processes in the contracting process, but also provides concrete 
examples of fraud occurrences” (Chang, 2013, p. 31). Chang also employed 
“organizational Likert scale questions” and used “the ACFE contract and procurement 
fraud data” (Chang, 2013, p. 32). 
2. Development of Demographic Questions 
Using the previously developed survey, the demographic questions collected data 
about the contracting professionals participating in the research. The survey includes a 
range of questions that asks whether they are civilian or military, what their experience is 
within the contracting field, whether they currently hold a Contracting Officer warrant, 
and what their DAWIA certification level is (Chang, 2013). 
3. Development of Knowledge-Based Questions 
As stated by Chang, the survey measured the level of procurement fraud 
knowledge among the participants “according to each of the six contract processes, five 
internal control components, and six procurement fraud schemes” (Chang, 2013, p. 32). 
The questions assess contracting professionals’ knowledge of contracting. The survey 
provides the contracting professionals with examples of fraud situations and asks them to 
identify the fraud scheme. “The questions were developed from the various fraud 
indicators listed in government reports and other resources. All of the 27 knowledge 
questions were multiple-choice format, with four possible answers” (Chang, 2013, p. 32). 
4. Development of Organizational Perception Questions 
In addition to demographics and general knowledge questions, the previously 
developed survey asks the contracting professionals 12 questions about their 
organization. These questions use the Likert scale to assess what participants thought 
about their organization’s susceptibility to fraudulent activity (Chang, 2013). 
Furthermore, the organizational questions assess each contracting professional’s 
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awareness of fraud in their organization. The Naval Postgraduate School Institutional 
Review Board approved the assessment tool and the survey questions to insure protection 
of human subjects for previous research as well as this research. 
C. DEPLOYMENT OF THE SURVEY 
A Navy designated person, not in the chain of command, was sent a hyperlink 
from the researchers. A Navy contracting command through an online website called 
LimeSurvey responded to the survey. The contracting professionals had four weeks to 
participate in the survey and no time limit once the survey was open to complete the 
questions. The Navy designated person, who sent out the initial email survey link, also 
sent reminder messages to complete the survey if the contracting professionals had not 
already done so throughout the four weeks. The participants solicited were military and 
civilian contracting professionals who work for the Navy contracting command. The 
contracting professionals included warranted contracting officers with different levels of 
contracting certifications.  
D. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 
The researchers analyzed the survey responses using descriptive statistics 
identifying patterns and potential correlations among the demographics. The responses to 
the questions related to the processes of contract management, internal control components, 
and procurement fraud schemes. The researchers assessed all of the responses to see which 
process, component, or fraud scheme had the highest susceptibility to fraud within the 
organization (Chang, 2013). Similar to Chang, Castillo and Flanigan (2014), the 
researchers compared the survey responses to the participant’s demographics (e.g., 
employment status, DAWIA certification level, and years of experience).  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the methodology used to develop this research, the use of 
the previously developed assessment tool, deployment of the survey to a Navy contracting 
organization, and how the results of the survey will be analyzed. The next chapter discusses 
the findings, analysis from the results of the survey, and recommendations. 
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IV. FINDINGS, ANALYSIS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the results of the survey responses compiled from the 
LimeSurvey website. The survey questions address the competent personnel aspect of the 
auditability triangle (Figure 1) to assess contracting personnel’s knowledge level 
regarding contract management processes, internal control components, and procurement 
fraud schemes. The researchers compare the demographic, knowledge-based, and 
organizational perception questions with the contract management processes, internal 
control components, and procurement fraud schemes. Based on the results of the analysis 
and implications, the researchers provide recommendations to improve the contracting 
professionals’ knowledge on procurement fraud schemes.  
B. FINDINGS FROM DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
1. Survey Response 
The survey was distributed to 82 contracting professionals in one Navy 
contracting organization on January 26, 2016, and the survey hyperlink remained open 
until February 12, 2016. Two additional email reminders were sent after week one to the 
82 contracting professionals. Thirty-two contracting professionals completed the survey 
while another 12 opened the survey but did not complete it, resulting in a 39% response 
rate. The 12 contracting professionals who did not complete the survey were not included 
in the findings and analysis.  
2. Reponses by Employment Category 
The 32 respondents to the survey were all civilian with zero participants from the 
uniformed military. A large number of civilian respondents were expected due to the 
organizational structure which has a low percentage of military personnel.  
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3. Responses by Experience 
Figure 8 presents responses received from contracting professionals based on their 
level of contracting experience using the following contracting experience year groups: 0 
to 2, 3 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 20, and over 20 years. Only one (3%) of the contracting 
professionals who had participated in the study had 11 to 20 years of experience. Two 
(6%) of the participants had more than 20 years of experience. Ninety-one percent of the 
respondents had less than 10 years of contracting experience. 
 
Figure 8.   Number of Participants by Experience Category. 
4. Responses by DAWIA Certification Level 
Figure 9 presents the contracting professional’s DAWIA certification level using 
the following contracting levels: no certification, Level I, Level II, or Level III 
certification, which is the highest level of certification. The highest number of 
respondents hold a Level II certification (47%), while the lowest number of respondents 
hold a Level I certification (12%). Seven (22%) of the respondents were contracting 
professionals who have no certifications. 
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Figure 9.  Number of Participants by DAWIA Certification Level. 
5. Responses by Warrant Status 
Figure 10 presents the contracting professional’s response regarding warrant status. 
Twenty-five (78.13%) contracting professionals indicated that they did not hold a warrant, 
while seven (21.88%) contracting professionals indicated that they held a warrant.  
 
Figure 10.  Responses by Warrant Status. 
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This section discussed the findings from the survey based on the demographics of 
the respondents. The next section discusses the findings from the knowledge-based 
questions.  
C. FINDINGS FROM KNOWLEDGE-BASED QUESTIONS 
The survey consists of 27 knowledge-based questions classified as contract 
management process, internal control component, and procurement fraud scheme 
questions. Table 2 shows the distribution of questions categorized by contract 
management process, internal control component, and procurement fraud scheme. For the 
32 contracting professionals who responded to the survey, the average score for all of the 
knowledge-based questions was 58%.  
Table 2.   Number of Knowledge-Based Questions by Categories. Adapted 
from Chang (2013, p. 38). 
Contract 
Process 
Number 
of 
Questions 
Procurement 
Scheme 
Number 
of 
Questions 
Internal Control 
Components 
Number 
of 
Questions 
Procuremen
t Planning 5 Collusion 3 
Control 
Environment 4 
Solicitation 
Planning 5 
Conflict of 
Interest 6 Risk Assessment 6 
Solicitation 5 Bid Rigging 6 Control Activities 6 
Source 
Selection 5 
Billing/Cost/
Pricing 
Schemes 
5 Information and Communications 4 
Contract 
Administrati
on 
5 Fraudulent Purchases 4 Monitoring 7 
Contract 
Closeout 2 
Fraudulent 
Representation 3     
Total 27 Total 27 Total 27 
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1. Analysis by Demographic Classification 
a. Experience 
Figure 11 presents the average scores of all survey participants based on years of 
work experience as a contracting professional. Contracting professionals with contracting 
experience of 0 to 2 years (60.37%) and 3 to 5 years (60.49%) had a higher average score 
compared to the contracting professionals who had 6 to 10 years (51.85%) and 10 to 20 
years (51.85%). The contracting professionals who had more than 20 years of experience 
(75.93%) had the highest average score. The average scores ranged from 51.85% to 
75.93%.  
 
Figure 11.  Average Score by Years of Experience. 
b. DAWIA Certification Level  
Figure 12 presents the results of the knowledge-based survey questions related to 
the DAWIA certification levels. On average, the contracting professionals with Level III 
certification responded to the most questions correctly (64.20%). Contracting 
professionals with Level II certifications scored the lowest (55.31%) similar to the 
contracting professionals with no certification (57.14%).  
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Figure 12.  Average Score by DAWIA Level. 
c. Warrant Status  
Figure 13 presents the average scores of the contracting professional’s warrant 
status. The contracting professionals who identified themselves as holding a warrant scored 
62.96% compared to the contracting professionals who did not hold a warrant and scored 
57.19%.  
 
Figure 13.   Average Score by Warranted Status. 
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2. Analysis of Contracting Processes 
Figure 14 presents the average score of the questions assessing the ability to 
identify procurement fraud by contracting process. The scores range from 75.63% 
(procurement planning) to 25.56% (contract closeout). The average overall scores for all 
of the questions combined regarding contracting processes was 55%.  
 
Figure 14.   Average Score by Contracting Process. 
3. Analysis by Internal Control Components 
Figure 15 presents the average score of the questions assessing the ability to 
identify fraud by internal control components. The scores range from 67.19% (control 
environment) to 50.00% (information and communication). Monitoring activities was the 
next lowest scoring (54.91%, Figure 15). The average overall scores for all of the 
questions combined regarding internal control components was 58%. 
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Figure 15.   Average Score by Internal Control Components. 
4. Analysis of Procurement Fraud Schemes 
Figure 16 presents the average score for each procurement fraud scheme area. The 
scores range from 77.60% (bid rigging) to 44.27% (conflict of interest). The respondents 
scored 69.79% for the collusion survey questions. The average overall score for all of the 
questions combined regarding procurement fraud schemes was 58%. 
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Figure 16.   Average score by Procurement Fraud Schemes. 
5. Analysis of Specific Questions 
The survey results of the knowledge-based questions allowed for the isolation of 
the most and least missed questions. The researchers categorized the questions most and 
least missed by the contracting processes, internal control components, and procurement 
fraud schemes. Underlined is the correct response for each survey question.  
a.  Most and Least Missed Knowledge-Based Questions 
The most commonly missed question out of all of the 27 knowledge-based 
questions surveyed was knowledge question number 18. Only 15% (five contracting 
professionals) of the 32 survey respondents answered the question correctly. This 
question generated a wide range of responses. Seven contracting professionals answered 
“A,” eight answered “B,” nine answered “D,” and three answered “I don’t know.” The 
following survey questions were created by Chang (2013, p. 41). 
K18. Which one of the following situations is MOST LIKELY an indicator of  
potential fraud during the evaluation of bids?  
A. Bids not being received at the expected location 
B. The majority of bids being received late 
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C. The low bidder being allowed to withdraw their bid 
D. A greater than expected variation in prices among bids 
E. I don’t know 
The knowledge question least missed was question number two. Thirty-one (96%) 
out of the 32 contracting professionals answered the question correctly. 
K2. Tailoring statements of work and specifications to suit a particular offeror 
A. Is an acceptable practice that shortens procurement lead times 
B. Helps level the playing field for disadvantaged competitors 
C. Is not acceptable because it prevents fair competition 
D. Is not acceptable because the government should not lower standards to 
industry levels 
E. I don’t know 
b. Contracting Process Analysis 
The average score for all of the contracting process type questions was 55%, as 
previously discussed. The most commonly missed questions from the contracting 
processes were in contract closeout (26.56%, Figure 14). Out of the two contract closeout 
questions from Table 2, the most missed was number 27. 
K27. When closing out a contract, which one of the following item will MOST 
LIKELY be an indicator of over-charging during the performance of the contract? 
A. Discovery that the contractor didn’t disclose their discounts and credits 
B. Discovery of left over materials after the completion of performance 
C. Disclosure by the contractor of their greater than estimated profit in a 
fixed-priced contract 
D. The greater than expected amount of government furnished material that 
was returned 
E. I don’t know 
The question most commonly answered correctly from the contracting process 
analysis was from procurement planning (75.63%, Figure 14). Out of the five 
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procurement planning questions from Table 2, question number two was most often 
answered correctly. 
K2. Tailoring statements of work and specifications to suit a particular offeror 
A. Is an acceptable practice that shortens procurement lead times 
B. Helps level the playing field for disadvantaged competitors 
C. Is not acceptable because it prevents fair competition 
D. Is not acceptable because the government should not lower standards to 
industry levels 
E. I don’t know 
c. Internal Control Component Analysis 
In the internal control components analysis, the average of all of the scores among 
the contracting professionals who responded to the survey was 58%, as previously 
discussed. The most commonly missed knowledge-based questions from the internal 
control analysis was in the information and communication (50.00%, Figure 15) 
component. The next most commonly missed knowledge-based questions came from 
monitoring activities (54.19%, Figure 15). Out of the four information and 
communication questions, the most missed was number 27 as mentioned earlier. 
K27. When closing out a contract, which one of the following item will MOST 
LIKELY be an indicator of over-charging during the performance of the contract?  
A. Discovery that the contractor didn’t disclose their discounts and credits 
B. Discovery of left over materials after the completion of performance 
C. Disclosure by the contractor of their greater than estimated profit in a 
fixed-priced contract 
D. The greater than expected amount of government furnished material that 
was returned 
E. I don’t know 
The most commonly answered correct questions in the internal control 
components analysis were from control environment (67.19%, Figure 15). Out of the four 
control environment questions from Table 2, question number 17 was most answered 
correctly.  
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K17. An offeror, whose proposal is claiming to meet the solicitation requirements 
without intending to do so is committing this type of fraud. 
A. Bid Rigging 
B. Cost Mischarging 
C. Product Substitution 
D. Fraudulent Representation 
E. I don’t know 
d. Procurement Fraud Scheme Analysis 
In the procurement fraud scheme analysis, the average of all the scores among the 
contracting professionals who responded to the survey was 58% as previously discussed. 
The most commonly missed knowledge questions from the procurement fraud scheme 
analysis was in the conflict of interest procurement fraud scheme (44.27%, Figure 16). 
Out of the six conflict of interest questions from Table 2, question number 18 was the 
most missed question, as previously mentioned. 
K18. Which one of the following situations is MOST LIKELY indicator of 
potential fraud during the evaluation of bids?  
A. Bids not being received at the expected location 
B. The majority of bids being received late 
C. The low bidder being allowed to withdraw their bid 
D. A greater than expected variation in prices among bids 
E. I don’t know 
The most commonly answered correct questions from the procurement fraud 
scheme analysis were in the bid rigging section (77.60%, Figure 16). Out of the six bid 
rigging questions from Table 2, question number 2 was the most often answered 
correctly, as previously mentioned. 
K2. Tailoring statements of work and specifications to suit a particular offeror 
A. Is an acceptable practice that shortens procurement lead times 
B. Helps level the playing field for disadvantaged competitors 
C. Is not acceptable because it prevents fair competition 
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D. Is not acceptable because the government should not lower standards to 
industry levels 
E. I don’t know 
This section discussed the findings from the knowledge-based questions. The next 
section discusses the analysis of the organizational questions.  
D. ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS 
The survey concluded with 12 questions created by Rendon and Rendon (2015) 
assessing the contracting workforce’s perception to fraud vulnerability. The first nine 
questions included the possible answers of “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neither agree 
nor disagree,” “agree,” “strongly agree,” and either “I don’t know” or “I prefer not to 
answer.” Each answer was quantified and added to a Likert-Scale (see Appendix). The 
final three questions determined which procurement fraud scheme, contracting process, 
and internal control component the respondents believed the organization to be the most 
vulnerable. 
1. Analysis of Likert-Scale Organization Questions 
The Likert-scale questions ranged in scores from zero to five: zero representing “I 
don’t know,” one representing “strongly disagree,” two representing “disagree,” three 
representing “neither agree nor disagree,” four representing “agree,” and five 
representing “strongly agree” (see Appendix). The mean for all the respondents to the 
first nine organizational questions regarding the contracting professionals’ perception of 
their organization’s ability to detect and respond to fraud was a 4.24. The mean for each 
question ranged from a low of 3.66 to a high of 4.72 (see Appendix). The question with 
the highest mean (4.72) asked whether the contracting professional would report 
suspicious activity or not (see Appendix, Question 3). Every contracting professional 
surveyed responded either “agree” or “strongly agree” to that organizational question.  
The question with the lowest mean (3.66) asked whether the contracting 
professional had adequate knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to perform their 
duties (see Appendix, Question 6). Two contracting professionals answered “strongly 
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disagree,” four answered “disagree,” six answered “neither agree nor disagree,” 11 
answered “agree,” and nine answered “strongly agree.”  
2. Analysis of Perception Questions 
The perception questions fall into three categories: contracting processes, internal 
control components, and procurement fraud schemes. The researchers analyzed the 
categories by the percentage of fraud susceptibility.  
a.  Contracting Processes  
Figure 17 presents the responses by the contracting professionals regarding which 
contracting process they believe is most vulnerable to fraud within their organization. 
Fourteen (43.75%) contracting professionals do not suspect any fraudulent activity in the 
contracting management process in their organization. Seven (21.88%) of the contracting 
professionals who responded to the survey believe “Contract Administration” to be the 
most susceptible to procurement fraud. Three (9.38%) contracting professionals selected 
the “Solicitation” process as the most susceptible to fraud in their organization. One 
(3.13%) contracting professional selected “I preferred not to answer.” Zero of the 
participants believed “Procurement Planning,” “Solicitation Planning,” and “Source 
Selection” were the most susceptible to fraud.  
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Figure 17.   Percentage of Responses to Contracting Process Perception 
Question. 
b. Internal Control Components 
The survey asked the contracting professionals which control component they 
believed to be the most susceptible to fraud within their organization. Figure 18 shows 15 
(46.88%) of the contracting professionals who responded to the survey do not suspect 
fraud in their organization, while seven (21.88%) of the contracting professionals 
answered “I don’t know.” Four (12.50%) of the contracting professionals believe 
“Monitoring” has the highest susceptibility to fraud. Two (6.25%) of the contracting 
professionals (one in each internal control component) believe “Control Activities” and 
“Information and Communications” are the most vulnerable to fraudulent activity, but 
none of the contracting professionals believed the “Control Environment” component is 
the most susceptible to fraud. Two (6.25%) of the contracting professionals selected “I 
prefer not to answer.” 
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Figure 18.   Percentage of Responses to Internal Control Perception Question. 
c. Procurement Fraud Scheme 
The survey asked the contracting professionals which procurement fraud scheme 
they believed their organization was most susceptible. Figure 19 shows 17 (53.13%) of 
the contracting professionals who responded to the survey do not believe their 
organization is susceptible to procurement fraud, while six (18.75%) answered “I don’t 
know.” Two (6.25%) of the contracting professionals selected the following: “I prefer not 
to answer,” “Conflict of Interest,” and “Collusion.” No one selected “Bid Rigging” as a 
susceptible fraud scheme in their organization.  
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Figure 19.   Percentage of Responses to Procurement Fraud Scheme Question. 
This completes the findings of the research conducted. The next section discusses 
the analysis and implications of the findings of the knowledge-based questions with the 
perception questions of the organization.  
E. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
1. Demographic  
The first aspect of auditability is competent personnel. This survey assessed the 
contracting professionals’ level of procurement fraud knowledge. As displayed in Figure 
11, the findings showed the contracting professionals who had between 0 to 5 years of 
experience had approximately 9% higher scores than their counterparts with 6 to 20 years 
of experience. This may be due to the contracting professionals becoming complacent in 
their careers. As time goes on, the contracting professionals get further away from their 
initial institutional contracting training and/or may not be pursuing training on detecting 
fraud. This decrease in average scores might also indicate Level I contracting 
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professionals may have recently received procurement fraud training compared to their 
Level II counterparts.  
DAWIA Level II certified contracting professionals scored (55.31%, Figure 12) 
similar to the contracting professionals who held no DAWIA certification (57.14%, 
Figure 12). This could indicate that having a DAWIA certification does not guarantee 
receiving training on detecting procurement fraud indicators. Alternatively, warranted 
contracting professionals scored higher than non-warranted contracting professionals 
(62.96% versus 57.19%, Figure 13). Selection for contracting officers to hold a warrant 
requires knowledge of acquisition policies and procedures, education, experience, and 
acquisition training courses (FAR, 2016). This could indicate that warranted 
professionals may have been required to receive training on detecting procurement fraud. 
2. Contracting Processes 
The second aspect of auditability is capable processes. This survey assessed the 
contracting professionals’ awareness of procurement fraud vulnerability within the 
organization’s contracting process. When comparing the knowledge-based questions to 
the perception question on contracting processes, the lowest average score in the 
contracting processes were from source selection (42.50%, Figure 14) and contract 
closeout (26.56%, Figure 14). It is interesting to note that the contracting professionals 
deemed these same two contracting processes as the least vulnerable to procurement 
fraud. This indicates that the contracting professionals may not have been trained to 
detect procurement fraud within these processes. Additionally, this may also indicate that 
there might not be enough oversight during the sources selection and contact closeout 
process.  
In Hidaka and Owens’ (2015) research, they concluded that the biggest 
vulnerability in contracting processes, DOD-wide, was in procurement planning and 
contract administration. However, this current research indicates there may be sufficient 
training on procurement planning and contract administration in place at this Navy 
organization. This might indicate that the knowledge level for detecting actual fraud may 
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vary organization to organization based on the competency of the contracting 
professionals.  
3. Internal Control Components 
The third aspect of auditability is effective internal controls. This survey assessed 
the contracting professionals’ awareness of procurement fraud vulnerability within the 
organization’s internal controls. When comparing the knowledge-based questions 
compared to the perception question regarding the internal control components, the 
lowest knowledge-based score was in the information and communication (50.00%, 
Figure 15) component. The next lowest was monitoring activities (54.19%, Figure 15). 
The survey participants do not believe that information and communication is susceptible 
to fraud in their organization. Four (12.50%, Figure 18) contracting professionals believe 
monitoring activities was susceptible to fraud in their organization. As previously 
discussed, COSO (2009) provided additional guidance on monitoring activities due to the 
lack of implementation in industry. The results of this research indicate a lack of 
knowledge regarding monitoring activities and possible fraud vulnerabilities. This 
indicates that perhaps the contracting professionals may not be able to detect fraud in 
areas in which they have not been trained. In contrast, the highest knowledge-based score 
was in the control environment (67.19%, Figure 15) component. None of the respondents 
believes that control environment is susceptible to procurement fraud. This may indicate 
that the management and structure of internal controls in the organization is effective.  
4. Procurement Fraud Schemes 
In reference to the auditability triangle, procurement fraud schemes is one of the 
components. When comparing the knowledge-based questions to the perception question 
regarding the procurement fraud schemes, the lowest score was in conflict of interest 
(44.27%, Figure 16). Two (6.25%, Figure 18) of the contracting professionals surveyed 
believed that their organization was susceptible to this type of fraud. Yet two (6.25%, 
Figure 18) contracting professionals selected “I prefer not to answer” whether their 
organization was susceptible to procurement fraud. This could indicate the possibility of 
vulnerabilities to fraud in the organization.  
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Each of the organizational type questions had responses of “I prefer not to 
answer” by one or two contracting professionals. This may indicate that the organization 
does not want the reputation of fraud in their organization or that the organization does 
not try to deter procurement fraud by publishing the ramifications of fraud for those who 
have been caught. 
5. Likert-Scale Questions 
The mean score of all the Likert-Scale organizational type questions was 4.24, 
which equates to just above “agree” (4.0). This is a reflection of the respondents’ 
perceptions that there are sufficient procedures in place in their organization to combat 
procurement fraud. However, the respondents only scored 58% on the knowledge-based 
questions. This discrepancy could indicate that more training is needed for the 
contracting professionals to detect procurement fraud.  
F. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON ANALYSIS 
The findings from the research lead to several recommendations for change 
within the contracting profession, Navy contracting, and DOD procurement. The 
recommendations consist of additional procurement fraud training, improve monitoring 
activities of all contract processes, and improve understanding of procurement fraud 
schemes. 
1. Add Procurement Fraud Training Programs 
The findings indicate that there is a gap between the knowledge level of 
contracting professionals and what they should know. According to DOD Instruction 
5000.66, as long as an individual remains a member of the acquisition workforce, he/she 
must earn 80 Continuous Learning Points (CLP) every other year until they are no longer 
in an acquisition related position (USD[AT&L], 2005). Procurement fraud training such 
as CLM 049 could be mandated for contracting professionals who are DAWIA Level II 
certified. In addition to contacting professionals, the Contracting Officer’s Representative 
(COR) should complete training on procurement fraud during the contract closeout 
process.  
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2. Improve Monitoring Activities of All Contract Processes 
The findings indicate that the contract closeout process scored the lowest among 
the six contracting processes (26.56%, Figure 14), and one person perceived this process 
to be the most vulnerable to procurement fraud. There may have only been a small 
number of contracting professionals who work in the contract closeout section for this 
organization, which would justify the low scores as well as perception of fraud 
vulnerability. Since monitoring activities and information and communication both 
received low levels (54.19% and 50.00%, Figure 15), this may indicate that there is a 
direct correlation between monitoring activities and procurement fraud vulnerability, 
specifically to the contract closeout process. Improved monitoring activities will assist in 
detecting organizational weaknesses in areas of procurement fraud regardless of the 
contracting process. For organizations that are not aligned with COSO’s 2013 internal 
control standards, they can refer to McNally’s five step approach discussed earlier to 
ensure effective internal controls are in place. If the organization has relatively few 
professionals involved in contract closeout, a recommendation is to rotate the contracting 
professionals in each contracting process to strengthen process capability and ensure 
competent knowledge.  
3. Improve Understanding of Procurement Fraud Schemes 
The lowest average score of the procurement fraud schemes were in the conflict 
of interest (44.27%, Figure 16) areas. Organizations should consider including ethics 
training to all of those involved in the contracting process. Contracting professionals 
should also limit personal relationships with individuals or companies seeking DOD 
contracts.  
This completes the recommendations based on the analysis section. The next 
section discusses the summary for this chapter.  
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter covered the findings, results, and analysis from the survey. The 
findings reflect the demographics of the contracting professionals who responded to the 
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survey. The researchers analyzed the responses by procurement processes, internal 
control components, and procurement fraud schemes. Based on the results and analysis of 
the responses, the researchers provided the implications from the findings and 
recommendations to improve procurement fraud detection for contracting professionals 
in the Navy and the DOD. The next chapter presents the summary, conclusions, and other 
areas for further research.  
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The opportunity to commit procurement fraud is still a great concern of the 
federal government. Regardless of the budget, the possibility of fraud being committed 
should always be a concern. Therefore, competent personnel, capable contract 
management processes, and effective internal controls, which are the three aspects of 
auditability, are crucial to reduce the opportunities for fraud to be committed. Although 
this falls heavily on the contracting professionals, it is also the responsibility of all those 
who work in acquisition. The purpose of this research was to analyze the knowledge level 
of Navy contracting professionals regarding contract management processes, internal 
controls, and procurement fraud schemes.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
To answer the research questions presented in Chapter I, the researchers reviewed 
current literature, discussed the deployment of the survey tool, and analyzed the 
responses from the survey for findings so that recommendations could be provided.  
The first research questions is: 
(1) “What is the [Navy’s] contracting professionals’ knowledge level of 
procurement fraud as related to the contract management process, 
internal control components, and procurement fraud schemes?” 
(Chang, 2013, p. 2) 
The analysis of the responses from the knowledge-based questions revealed that 
there is a significant discrepancy in the ability of the contracting professionals to detect 
procurement fraud. Among the contracting processes, procurement planning received the 
highest score (75.63%, Figure 14) and contract closeout received the lowest score 
(26.56%, Figure 14). When examining the responses to the internal control knowledge-
based questions, control environment received the highest score (67.19%, Figure 15) and 
information and communications received the lowed score (50.00%, Figure 15). The 
contracting professionals’ knowledge level in detecting procurement fraud schemes also 
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presented a discrepancy. The highest score came from bid rigging (77.60%, Figure 16) 
and the lowest score came from conflict of interest (44.27%, Figure 16). These findings 
suggest vulnerabilities in the organization’s contract management processes and internal 
control components as well as susceptibility to procurement fraud schemes. 
The second research question is:  
(2) “What is the [Navy’s] contracting professionals’ perception of 
procurement fraud vulnerability as related to the contract 
management process, internal control components, and procurement 
fraud schemes?” (Chang, 2013, p. 2) 
The results from the responses of the organizational perception questions reveal 
the contracting professionals are relatively self-assured in their organization’s processes, 
knowledge level to detect procurement fraud, and capability to effectively respond to 
fraud, if detected. The average score of all of the responses to the Likert-scale questions 
was a 4.24. A score of three means “neither agree nor disagree” and a score of four 
means “agree.” When analyzing the responses by contracting processes, 43.75% (Figure 
17) of those surveyed did not suspect fraud in any of the contracting processes. When 
analyzing responses by internal controls, 46.88% (Figure 18) did not suspect procurement 
fraud. Finally, when analyzing responses of possible procurement fraud schemes, 53.13% 
(Figure 19) of those surveyed did not suspect procurement fraud. All of the areas had a 
high response of “I don’t know.” This suggests that even though the majority of the 
respondents do not suspect procurement fraud, they may not be competent enough to 
detect fraud indicators. The next section discusses areas for further research that can be 
conducted.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This section has four suggestions for further research. This research was limited 
to only a specific Navy contracting agency. The first suggestion is to expand this research 
to other Navy organizations. The literature review identified past research that was 
performed in this area for the Army and the Air Force. The second suggestion would be 
to compare the Navy with the Army and the Air Force. This will evaluate if there is a 
standard level of knowledge across the DOD. The third suggestion is to conduct research 
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assessing the procurement fraud knowledge level of senior leadership. Assessing the 
senior contracting officials or the heads of contracting activities will test if effective 
internal controls are in place against procurement fraud. The final suggestion is to expand 
the procurement fraud knowledge assessment to other federal contracting or non-
contracting acquisition workforce. Procurement fraud affects all acquisition personnel; 
therefore, further research may be appropriate.  
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4.72 
4.22 
APPENDIX: LIKERT SCALE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
(1) “My department has clear lines of authority and responsibility” 
(Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 721).  
 
 
 
I prefer not to answer: 0 
 
(2) “My department is regularly reviewed by internal or external 
auditors” (Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 721). 
 
 
I do not know: 3 
 
(3) “I would report fraudulent or suspicious activity if I saw or suspected 
it” (Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 721). 
 
 
I do not know: 0 
 
4.24 
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4.13 
(4) “I have a clear way of reporting fraudulent or suspicious activity 
within my organization” (Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 721). 
 
 
I do not know: 2 
 
(5) “I know who to report to if I saw or suspected fraudulent activities” 
(Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 721). 
 
 
 
I do not know: 0 
 
(6) “I have adequate knowledge of contracting fraud schemes to perform 
my duties.” (Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 721). 
 
 
 
I do not know: 0 
3.66 
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4.14 
4.47 
4.56 
(7) “Instances of reported suspected fraudulent or suspicious activity 
have been adequately investigated by my organization” (Rendon & 
Rendon, 2015, p. 721). 
 
 
I do not know: 18 
 
(8) “Employees in my organization who are found to have participated in 
fraudulent activities will be subject to appropriate consequences” 
(Rendon & Rendon, 2015, p. 721).  
 
 
I do not know: 7 
 
(9) “My organization places sufficient emphasis on the importance of 
integrity, ethical conduct, fairness and honesty in their dealings with 
employees, vendors and other organizations” (Rendon & Rendon, 
2016, p. 721). 
 
 
I do not know: 0 
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